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Abstract 
 
Despite the considerable interest in the concept of human 
development, there has been little research on the political 
determinants of its dimensions. This paper investigates the role 
played by the type of political systems on the non-income 
components of human development. In particular it tests the 
hypothesis that it is not only democratic countries that enhance 
spending on health and education, but this might be true of autocratic 
regimes. The hypothesis is tested for the former Soviet Republics. It 
is found that expenditure on the social provision of health and 
education increases with both the degree of democracy and 
autocracy. 
 
JEL: I10 I20 H51 H52 C33 
Key words: governing authority, human development, political 
regimes, public expenditure on health and education, panel analysis. 
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Introduction 
 
Human development is an all-encompassing concept. Sen (1999, 
p.xii) has defined it “as the removal of various types of un-freedoms 
that leave people with little choice and little opportunity of 
exercising their reasoned agency”. A distinction is often made 
between individuals’ functionings and their capabilities. The 
functionings are the aspirations of individuals while capabilities are 
the abilities to achieve these. According to Sen (1999, p.75)  the 
“valued functionings may vary from elementary ones, such as being 
adequately nourished and being free from avoidable disease, to very 
complex activities or personal states, such as being able to take part 
in the life of the community and having self-respect”. Hence, two 
individuals may have the same functionings, but very different 
capability sets. As an individual’s capability basically reflects the 
various combinations of functionings that are de facto possible to be 
achieved, the capability set defines the ability of individual to 
choose. 
This approach views development as a process of enlarging people’s 
choices and enhancing human capabilities and freedoms. The degree 
to which this has been achieved is somewhat imperfectly measured 
by the United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) Human 
Development Index. A lengthy and healthy life, access to knowledge 
and an adequate standard of living are the three essential capabilities 
measured by the index. The rationale is that if these basic capabilities 
are not present, many choices are not available and opportunities 
remain completely inaccessible. Empirical studies on comparative 
development have made an extensive use of this index, which 
captures the idea that “development is about much more than 
income” (UNDP, Human Development Report 1990). The literature 
that considers what type of political institutions foster development 
has in general focused on democratic institutions and has widely 
studied their impact on the income dimension of human development 
(see, for example, Acemogluet al., 2008; Rodriket al., 2005; Rodrik, 
2007; Easterly et al., 2006). There have been relatively fewer studies 
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of the role and the effect of different political systems on the non-
income components of the index. Some studies have focused on the 
effects of the degree of democracy on just one such component (e.g., 
Franco, et al., 2004; Besleyet al., 2006; Stasavage, 2005), while 
others have considered the impact of democracy on African and 
other developing countries (Stasavage, 2005; Tsai, 2006). Some have 
studied the role of the public spending on education and health care 
in the developing and transition countries (Gupta et al., 2002). More 
recently, Vollmer and Ziegler (2009) extended this strand of research 
and analyzed, in a large sample of countries, the impact of 
democracy on life expectancy and adult literacy. They found using 
cross-sectional time-series data that democracy has a positive effect 
on human development.  
However, there has been relatively little emphasis on the proposition 
that it is not only democratic governments that may foster the two 
non-income components of human development, namely health and 
education. Under certain circumstances, repressive and autocratic 
political systems may also have the incentive to sustain health care 
and educational systems in an attempt to legitimize themselves and 
to minimize the risks of political dissent.  Thus, it is possible that 
both democratic and autocratic political systems could enhance 
human development, although this would be variance with a central 
tenet of Sen’s thesis.  
The aim of the paper is as follows. We consider a set of countries 
with the same historical and cultural background, namely the former 
Soviet Union Republics1. An approach is adopted that examines the 
various channels that different political systems take to influence 
human development. We focus on two basic non-income 
components of development, namely, government expenditure on 
health and education. The proposition is tested that not only 
democracy, but also the degree of autocracy, have a positive effect 
                                                 
1 These consist of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan. 
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on these2. It is shown that considering human development just in 
terms of these three dimensions (income, health and education)could 
be, to some extent, misleading.  
 
Since they gained independence in 1991, the former Soviet Union 
countries have followed different growth paths and now constitute a 
fairly heterogeneous group of economies, both from an economic 
and a political point of view. Some have grown rapidly and appear 
similar to the advanced economies; some started a program of 
reforms without any great success; and some have made little or no 
attempt at modernization with a resulting backward economy. In 
particular, the Baltic Republics, helped by macroeconomic 
stabilization programs, implemented policies that led to economic 
and political development. Belarus, Russia and Ukraine experienced 
ineffective economic policies, while Armenia, Azerbaijan and 
Georgia were subject to military conflicts. The Central Asian States, 
which are generally subject to serious corruption and flawed 
elections, did not experience any significant economic improvement 
and remain as highly autocratic countries. (Lavigne, 1999; Polity IV 
Country Report, 2010) 
Although since independence these countries have followed different 
development paths, they share the same set of historical 
preconditions. In particular, an important characteristic shared by the 
former Soviet Republics is the comprehensive provision of education 
and health care. Under the Soviet system, the role of education and 
health was emphasized because they both were seen not so much as a 
personal matter, but as part of the national wealth. To this end, the 
government provided a free and universal education to all its citizens 
and operated a vast network of learning institutions, including 
preschools, general secondary schools3, specialized secondary 
schools, vocational-technical schools, trade schools and special 
                                                 
2 Democracy and Autocracy are defined below, but it should be noted that these two 
indices are constructed from different variables. 
3 Completion of the secondary school program became compulsory in 1970. 
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education schools, as well as universities and other institutions of 
higher learning. In particular, the education and training of 
specialists and skilled workers remained of central concern. Health 
was also considered as important, in order to have a labor force able 
to sustain and strengthen the nation’s economy. The health care 
system, fully public and highly centralized, was driven by two 
underlying principles: provision by the government of readily 
available and free health care and the prevention of illness. As a 
result, under the Soviet Union regime, individuals were relatively 
well-educated and had equal access to basic health care. 
Consequently, the former Soviet Republics were subsequently 
influenced by this tradition and they have continued to maintain this 
emphasis on health and education, notwithstanding the subsequent 
divergence of their development status and the nature of their 
political institutions. The governments of these countries, mostly 
constituted by the same political elites as under the Soviet system, 
have continued to prioritize the resources earmarked for the 
educational and health care systems. In this sense, the development 
of these countries has been path dependent. Nevertheless, these 
countries followed very different paths of democratization. Hence, 
they constitute heterogeneous sample with which to test the 
hypothesis that, under particular conditions (traditions), autocratic 
governments also have the incentive to follow a pattern of public 
expenditure substantially similar to that of democracies. As we noted 
above, this may be because they wish to appear philanthropic in 
order to legitimize their regime. This analysis, exploiting the 
peculiarities of these countries, allows a reconsideration of the 
approach used to understand the relationship between political 
institutions and human development and to suggest new research 
directions. 
 
In the next section, we provide some descriptive statistics of the 
former Soviet Republics. The next section explains the model. It 
discusses the working hypotheses, the reasons underlying the 
specification and the econometric methodology implemented. This is 
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followed by a presentation of the results and this section discusses 
their theoretical implications. The last section concludes. 
 
1. The Political Institutions and the Former Soviet Republics 
 
In this section we consider some descriptive statistics. We use the 
average of the Polity2 index4 for the period 1992-2010 to analyze the 
differences in the political institutions in the former Soviet 
Republics. 
The index ranges from -10 denoting “full autocracy” to +10, “full 
democracy”. It describes the type of government that spans from 
fully institutionalized autocracies (-10 to -6), through mixed, 
authority regimes, termed anocracies (-5 to +5), to fully 
institutionalized democracies (+6 to +10). The Scores are shown in 
Figure 1. It can be seen that since independence, the political paths of 
these countries have been very different. Some of them have moved 
towards a democratic government, most notably, the three Baltic 
republics. Some countries, such as Georgia and Moldova have begun 
a strong democratization process. Others (Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan) are assessed as 
mixed authority regimes, and finally Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
are de facto dictatorships.  
 
  
                                                 
4 Source: Polity IV Project Database. 
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Figure 1 - Nature of the political systems. 
 
 
From the arguments presented above, there should be no systematic 
differences among these countries in terms of the provision of the 
public education and health care systems. To determine whether or 
not this is the case we perform a simple comparative exercise. We 
compute the average achievements in education and health, using 
adult literacy5 and life expectancy6 data over the 1992-2010 period 
for the fifteen former Soviet Republics.  
                                                 
5 Percentage of people aged 15 years and older who can, with understanding, both 
read and write a short simple statement on their everyday life. Data Source: UNDP. 
6 Number of years a newborn infant could expect to live if prevailing patterns of 
age-specific mortality rates at the time of birth were to stay the same throughout the 
infant’s life. Data Source: UNDP. 
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Turning first to adult literacy, all the countries exhibit very high 
values for the years after independence. Moldova and Uzbekistan 
have the lowest performances, with an average percentage of 97.5 
and 98.1, respectively. These values show that the countries must 
kept up their high provision of education, regardless of the exact 
nature of their political systems. Concerning life expectancy, the 
lowest life expectancies are found in Turkmenistan (63.83 years), 
Tajikistan (64.17), Kazakhstan (65.93), Russia (66.1); the others all 
exhibit an average life expectancy equal to or greater than 67 years. 
 
 
Figure 2 - Health and Education Achievements  
over 1992-2010 period. 
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The former Soviet Republics present a worse achievement in terms 
of health, which depends not only on the quality of the health care 
system, but also on the dietary habits of people, and their alcohol and 
tobacco consumption. However, this poorer performance compared 
with education cannot be ascribed to the differing degree in terms of 
democratization (Figure 2).  
This is particularly clear if we consider the nature of the political 
systems of the countries with an average life expectancy greater than 
67 years. For instance, Azerbaijan, Belarus and Kyrgyzstan, 
authoritarian countries, have an average achievement consistent with 
that of Moldova, which is known to have started the democratic 
process. Consequently, notwithstanding the nature of their political 
institutions, the former Soviet Republics do not systematically 
exhibit differences in the non-income components of human 
development. This may be seen from the pie chart reported in Figure 
3. The government commitment to finance the health and education 
systems is considerable also for autocratic countries, despite the 
development status of their economies. In fact, many of these 
autocracies are poor countries. For instance, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan are low income countries; Uzbekistan, a lower middle 
income one (The World Bank). 
Table 1 shows that, on the one hand, the within standard deviation 
for the Polity2 score and health and education expenditure score is 
small, implying that each country, over the period considered, has 
not experienced a substantial variation in terms of political 
institutions and of government expenditure on health and education. 
On the other hand, the between standard deviation paints a different 
picture. The substantial disparity among these countries in the 
political dimension, as evidenced by the polity score, is not 
accompanied by a similar variation of the expenditure on the 
education and health care systems.  
 
  
13 
 
Figure 3 - Ex Soviet Republics Health & Education Government 
Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics for the 1992-2010 period. 
 Overall 
mean 
Within Standard 
Deviation 
Between Standard 
Deviation 
Polity2 scorea 1.066 2.075 6.666 
Health & Education 
public 
Expenditureb 
7.884 1.824 2.647 
 
Notes: a Data Source: Polity IV Project Database. b Data are expressed as a percentage of GDP. 
Data Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
55.09%
44.91%
Democracies Autocracies
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2. The theoretical framework  
 
To analyze the rationale underlying the health and education public 
spending, we explore the channels through which the governments of 
the  former Soviet Republics affect human development. 
A feature that has been  relatively neglected in the literature is that if 
we look at these measures of human development (which do not take 
into account the quality of the education programs and health 
services), it could be argued, as we have noted,  that autocratic 
regimes also have reasons to continue with expenditure on the non-
income components of human development, namely education and 
health. 
An authoritarian government may wish to provide broad access to 
basic education and medical care in order to legitimize itself and  
justify the repressive context under which its nationals live. In this 
regard, the former Soviet Republics constitute a useful sample as 
they seem to show that not only democratic political systems, but 
also those with more autocratic tendencies, may enhance human 
development. The descriptive statistics, discussed above, confirm 
that the emphasis placed by all these countries on education and 
health, which began about seventy years ago, has persisted7, even 
though now their political paths have diverged.  
The hypothesis to be tested is whether the different types of political 
institutions affect the level of expenditure on public educational and 
health care systems. The political systems are categorized in terms of 
(i) the state of democratic development and (ii) the structure of the 
political regime.  
The first reflects the extent to which political rights and civil liberties 
are guaranteed to all citizens in their daily lives. 
The stage of democratic development is likely to be a determinant of 
the degree of health and education public funding. Indeed, the 
                                                 
7 To some extent, this confirms also the North’s theoretical result concerning the 
importance of history for a country’s evolutionary pattern. 
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prediction of the median voter theorem is that the more democratic is 
the political system, the greater the level of redistribution. Following 
Keefer and Khemani (2005), we know that whenever the distribution 
of income is skewed to the right, towards the higher end of the 
income spectrum, the degree of redistribution should be larger. 
Therefore, if the income share held by the majority of the voting 
population is at the bottom of the income distribution, government 
spending should be larger in order to provide more extensive social 
services.  
More generally, this theorem captures the idea that to some extent 
any government may be responsive to the needs of the majority, 
when considering distributional issues. Even in a dictatorship, policy 
decisions may be influenced by the redistribution that affects the 
majority of the population. However, the weight placed on the 
different issues could be completely different. In fact, in autocratic 
systems, where a single individual has an unrestricted authority, a 
substantial part of the population is de facto excluded from the 
decision-making process, due to political repression, constitutional 
manipulation, and the consequent absence of political rights. The 
elections are not frequent, often labeled by the international 
observers as “not free and fair”, with many irregularities, and not 
characterized by political pluralism. Nevertheless, autocratic systems 
are still likely to implement redistributive policies simply because of 
the necessity to justify their power and to legitimize themselves. It is, 
for this reason, interesting to investigate whether these incentives can 
prevail when considering the operational concept of human 
development. 
The regime type determines the power of the government over 
legislation, namely the ability to amend or veto policy proposals. The 
first aspect concerns the separation of these powers across different 
politicians and offices; the second, the maintenance of these powers; 
in particular, whether the executive needs sustained confidence by a 
majority in the legislative assembly.  
Two types of regimes may be identified, namely, the presidential  
and  the parliamentary. The former have typically separation of 
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powers between the president and the assembly and the executive 
can continue in power without the support of a majority in elected 
assembly. In parliamentary regimes, the government needs the 
support of the majority of elected body to enact legislation.  
Political regimes are considered because, as Persson and Tabellini 
(2000, 2002) and Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000)8 show, they 
are seen to affect the expenditure behavior of the government. 
Presidential regimes with stronger separation of powers and not 
subject to a vote of no confidence by the assembly are found to have 
smaller governments and less spending on broad programs  
compared with parliamentary regimes. Moreover, this dichotomy 
into parliamentary and presidential regimes completes the analysis of 
the nature of a country’s political institutions, because it 
demonstrates how the political power is held.  
 
The kind of the governing authority, together with the regime type, 
depict the nature of the political systems and impact on the 
government attitude toward the non-income dimensions of human 
development. However, the role of political systems may be 
conditioned by other factors. Consequently, in addition to the stage 
of democratization and the structure of the political regimes, 
expenditure on education and health may also be affected by the 
level of per capita income, the degree of income inequality, endemic 
diseases and the extent of the social fragmentation.  All of these 
factors should be taken into account in the regression analysis to 
examine the determinants of education and health expenditure. 
To elaborate: first, both autocratic and democratic systems are 
expected to affect positively the health and education public 
spending for the reasons set out above. Secondly, knowing that 
countries with presidential regimes spend less on public services, the 
                                                 
8 The effect of electoral formulas is not considered because the focus is on the effect 
of the nature of different political systems on a particular subset of government 
expenditure and not on the general role of political institutions for the general public 
spending behavior. 
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structure of their political systems may influence also the 
government’s attitude towards the non-income components of human 
development. Thirdly, the existence of a constitutional limit on the 
number of years the executive can work is likely to condition the 
government behavior. It is necessary to assess whether or not the 
existence of a finite term in office may affect a government’s 
expenditure pattern, especially in the case of  an autocratic governing 
authority. According to our theoretical analysis, this should not make 
any difference. Fourthly, the joint effects of the political institutions 
on public spending are necessarily affected by the level of economic 
development. Fifthly, the more unequal the distribution of income of 
a country, the worse is likely to be the impact on the provision of 
public services. The greater the degree of inequality, and the more 
right skewed the distribution of income, the less is likely to be the 
effect on government redistribution. Benabou (2000), Rodriguez 
(2004), Alesina and Perotti (1996), Lee and Roemer (1999) have 
shown how in unequal societies there exist mechanisms that weaken 
the median voter hypothesis. They demonstrate that redistributions 
command less political support in unequal societies than in a more 
equitable one. They found that that inequality is negatively 
associated with redistribution because of rent-seeking and political 
influence and that, with greater inequality, a given tax rate yields less 
revenue for the same tax base. This induces less public spending. 
Greater inequality may also translate into an increased share of 
public resources accruing to individuals who are in a position to 
influence policy makers and pursue their own interests. Sixthly, the 
larger the incidence of disease, the greater is likely to be  the effect 
on health expenditure. Finally, the last dimension likely to affect the 
public funding of education and health care systems is the degree of 
social fragmentation. There is very little evidence about the impact 
of social fragmentation on “human development”. On one hand, a 
greater fractionalization and a higher degree of ethnic disparity may 
lead to a higher public commitment to shape the national identity via 
the expenditure on the educational system, which is imperative for 
many of the former Soviet Republics (Luong, 2004). On the other 
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hand, it could hamper the provision of social and public services 
whenever it leads to interest-group polarization with related rent-
seeking behavior (Alesina et al., 1999; Alesina et al., 2005). 
 
3. Panel Analysis and Results  
 
We  used a data set of the fifteen former Soviet Republics for the 
period 1992-2010. To quantify the attention paid to the two basic 
non-income dimensions of human development, we use the EBRD 
data (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) on health 
and education government expenditure9 (expressed as a percentage 
of GDP). The type of government is assessed by the degree of 
democracy (Democ) and autocracy (Autoc) variables taken from the 
Polity IV Project Database.  
These are separate measures used in the construction of the indices 
for Democ and Autoc. The Democ and Autoc indices both range 
from 0 to 10. Democ indicates at which stage of the democratic 
process the economy is at, and Autoc quantifies how deep is the 
authoritarian character of the political system. It should be noted that 
these indices are calculated from different variables and “many 
polities exhibit mixed qualities of both of these distinctive authority 
patterns” (Marshall et al., 2011, p.14). The Democracy variable is 
“conceived as three essential, interdependent elements. One is the 
presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can 
express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders. 
Second is the existence of institutionalized constraints on the 
exercise of power by the executive. Third is the guarantee of civil 
liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political 
participation” (p. 14). Autocracy is defined “operationally in terms of 
the presence of a distinctive set of political characteristics. In mature 
                                                 
9 Separate data (from other database) on health and education expenditure are 
available for few years and  give very incomplete series. This joint variable is used 
as in the case of EBRD data only few observations are not available.  
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form, autocracies sharply restrict or suppress competitive political 
participation” (p. 15).  
Following the theoretical discussion, it is necessary to consider also 
the regime types. A dummy variable PRES (presidential) was 
constructed. A country is defined presidential in a given year (PRES 
= 1), either if “president can veto legislation and the parliament 
needs a supermajority to override the veto or if president can appoint 
and dismiss prime minister and dissolve parliament” (Keefer, 2012, 
p. 4). Otherwise, the country is designated parliamentary (PRES = 
0)10.  
We also included a dummy variable, Finite-Term (FTerm), 
depending upon whether or there exists a constitutional limit on the 
number of years of the executive. It takes a value of 0 when a limit is 
not explicitly expressed and 1 otherwise11. 
To avoid endogeneity problems, the core political variables and the 
controls are specified at time t-1. Theoretically, this procedure 
estimates the impact that the political determinants at time t-1 have 
on the government behavior at time t. Their estimated coefficients 
are controlled for the level of economic development (measured by 
GDP per capita PPP, constant 2005 international dollars). 
Furthermore, we control for income inequality (measured by the Gini 
coefficient), the spreading of two endemic diseases,12 tuberculosis 
and HIV, and the degree of ethnic fragmentation.  
Tuberculosis is still pervasive in these countries. HIV showed an 
increase in the infection rate over the period considered. For 
tuberculosis, the variable used is the tuberculosis treatment success 
rate.13The rationale is that it provides an indication of the 
                                                 
10 The classification criteria of the Database of Political Institutions (The World 
Bank) is followed. 
11 Data Source: Database of Political Institutions. 
12 Data source: World Development Indicators Database. 
13Tuberculosis treatment success rate is the percentage of new, registered smear-
positive (infectious) cases that were cured or in which a full course of treatment was 
completed. 
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effectiveness of national programs and the public commitment in 
finding and diagnosing people with TB. For HIV, we use the 
percentage of people ages 15-49 who are infected. The extent of the 
ethnic fragmentation is assessed by the ethnic fractionalization14 
variable from Alesina et al. (2003), which enters in our model as a 
time invariant covariate.  
 
The model attempts to explain government spending behavior in 
terms of the measures of democracy and autocracy, and the regime 
dummy, controlling for economic development as their effects 
crucially depend on whether there is anything to redistribute. We 
then include progressively the other controls, while time dummies 
are added to all regressions to control further the estimation results. 
Time dummies eliminate the bias arising from unobserved variables 
that change over time, such as macroeconomic shocks and 
population dynamics. 
 
Preliminary tests with this model, which indicate the presence of 
cross-sectional dependence, heteroskedasticity and within panel 
AR(1) autocorrelation, suggest the appropriate estimation technique 
is feasible generalized least squares.15 
Table 2 reports the estimated impact of the kind of the governing 
authority. Each country has a different degree of democracy (Democ) 
and autocracy (Autoc). The indices are not mutually exclusive. 
Consequently, in every estimated regression is the impact of the 
                                                 
14 It measures the probability that two individuals selected at random from a 
population are members of different groups. 
15 As noted before (footnotes 8 and 13), in some cases data are not available for 
every year. To complete the dataset, we therefore use simple moving average 
between available observations or the latest available one. This procedure does not 
distort the series even that with the fewest observations. In fact, as we can see 
(Tables A.1 and A.2, Appendix A), the values of the between and within standard 
deviation for the “balanced” series are in line with those unbalanced. 
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other factor controlled for. The hypothesis is that both democracy 
and autocracy affect positively the government expenditure. 
It can be seen (Table 2) health and education expenditure is 
positively related to the level of democracy and the level of 
autocracy but is reduced by a presidential system. 
All the other regressors are statistically significant and take the 
expected sign. On the whole, the results confirm that democracy and 
autocracy are a positive determinant of the government spending 
decisions on health and education and that a difference is made by 
the structure of the political regime. A priori we would expect that 
presidential regimes have smaller governments and less spending on 
broad programs than parliamentary ones.  
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The estimated coefficients of the controls are in line with the 
theoretical arguments: the stage of economic development affects 
positively the level of public spending, whereas income inequality 
carries a negative effect on redistribution. A higher degree of the 
ethnic disparity, the greater is the level of public expenditure.16 This 
can be explained in terms of the political desire to homogenize the 
society and create a solid cultural identity via education. The HIV 
indicator has a positive and significant coefficient, meaning that the 
presence of infected cases has influenced the public expenditure to 
finance treatment and the supply of effective drug. The TBC 
treatment success rate displays a negative coefficient, confirming the 
effectiveness of the adopted program allows a reduction in health 
spending.  
The degree of authoritarianism has a positive impact on the attention 
that these governments give to the non-income components of 
human development. Hence, what makes the difference, among these 
countries, is not the nature of the governing authority, but the regime 
type. This evidence leads to the conclusion that also authoritarianism 
may be a positive determinant of the health and education 
expenditure.  
In the last table, Table 3, we proceed with the estimation of the same 
model  as in Table 2 except the impact that the number of years the 
executive can serve is included.  
                                                 
16The data do not allow the regressions to be run for health and education 
expenditure separately. 
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Since democracies have by their nature a constitutional limit on the 
number of years the executive can work, the existence of a finite 
term matters primarily when authoritarianisms are considered. 
We test for slope differences. We interact the Autoc variable with the 
finite-term indicator variable (FTerm), controlling for economic 
development and then including the other controls.  
The slopes of the finite term and without finite term profiles are not 
equal. As the estimation results reveal, autocratic governments with a 
finite term have a lower level of health and education public 
expenditure than ones that do not.  
This evidence stresses the importance for authoritarianisms to sustain 
health and education. In fact, these autocratic governments are 
known to keep and maintain power through many formal 
irregularities, unfair elections, and by suppressing to different extents 
both political opposition and political pluralism. In other words, they 
do not strictly need to care about re-election. By financing these 
social services, they “only” aim to justify themselves. In this 
perspective, this finding confirms that also autocracies may 
apparently care about “human development” when considering this 
operational approach, and the reasons are to be found in their 
willingness to legitimize and justify the repressive and un-free 
context in which people are obliged to live. This sample of countries 
shows precisely this incentive, which has never been proved before. 
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Conclusions 
 
It is generally considered that the expenditure on health and 
education are likely to be greater in the more democratic a country is, 
although the division between public and private provision may 
differ. Conversely, it may be thought that the more autocratic 
countries have less incentive to undertake such expenditure. This 
hypothesis was tested using panel data regression analysis for the 
former Soviet Union Republics. The advantage of this sample was 
that while all the countries shared a common culture and economic 
heritage, there political systems and economic policies have diverged 
markedly since their independence in 1991.  
The regression results in this paper suggest that the more autocratic 
countries also have an incentive to increase government expenditure, 
although it should be remembered that the variables capturing the 
degree of democracy and autocracy are not mutually exclusive. Some 
democratic countries can be more autocratic than others. 
Consequently, there is evidence that even the more repressive 
regimes may actually spend more on education and health in order to 
legitimize them themselves and possibly reduce dissent. Thus, 
contrary to Sen, it is not democracy per se that leads to improved 
capabilities for the population as a whole. However, not withstanding 
this there is no doubt that the more autocratic countries also have 
greater “un-freedoms” and it is questionable whether or not the 
people achieve the functionings that they value. 
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Appendix A 
Table A1 - Descriptive Statistics. “Balanced” Series. 
Variable   Mean Std. Dev. Observations 
Health &Education 
government 
expenditure   
overall 7.86 3.12 N = 285 
 between  2.66 n = 15 
 within  1.76 T = 19 
Autocracy overall 3 3.39 N = 285 
 between  3.33 n = 15 
 within  1.07 T = 19 
Democracy overall 4.06 3.57 N = 285 
 between  3.51 n = 15 
 within  1.09 T = 19 
Presidential Dummy overall .76 .42 N = 285 
 between  .41 n = 15 
 within  .13 T = 19 
Finite Term Dummy overall .90 .28 N = 285 
 between  .14 n = 15 
 within  .25 T = 19 
Gdp per head a overall 8.33 .79 N = 285 
 between  .74 n = 15 
 within  .33 T = 19 
Gini Index overall 35.69 5.16 N = 285 
 between  4.09 n = 15 
 within  3.30 T = 19 
Ethic 
Fractionalization overall .43 .15 N = 285 
 between  .16 n = 15 
 within  0 T = 19 
Prevalence HIV overall .24 .29 N = 285 
 between  .22 n = 15 
 within  .18 T = 19 
TBCtreatment 
success rate overall 70.29 10.52 N = 285 
 between  6.44 n = 15 
 within  8.47 T = 19 
Notes: a: Logarithmic Terms; N: total observations; n: countries; T: time periods. 
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Table A2 - Descriptive Statistics. “Unbalanced” Series. 
Variable   Mean Std. Dev. Observations 
Health &Education  
government 
expenditure   
overall 7.88 3.13 N = 255 
 between  2.64 n = 15 
 within  1.82 T = 17 
Autocracy overall 3 3.39 N = 285 
 between  3.33 n = 15 
 within  1.07 T = 19 
Democracy overall 4.06 3.57 N = 285 
 between  3.51 n = 15 
 within  1.09 T = 19 
Presidential 
Dummy overall .76 .42 N = 285 
 between  .41 n = 15 
 within  .13 T = 19 
Finite Term Dummy overall .90 .28 N = 285 
 between  .14 n = 15 
 within  .25 T = 19 
Gdp per heada overall 8.33 .79 N = 285 
 between  .74 n = 15 
 within  .33 T = 19 
Gini Index overall 35.02 5.02 N = 129 
 between  3.67 n = 15 
 within  3.25 T = 8.6 
Ethic 
Fractionalization overall .43 .15 N = 285 
 between  .16 n = 15 
 within  0 T = 19 
Prevalence HIV overall .25 .28 N = 252 
 between  .22 n = 14 
 within  .19 T = 18 
TBC treatment 
success rate overall 71.45 9.95 N = 195 
 between  6.09 n = 15 
 within  8.09 T = 13 
Notes: a: Logarithmic Terms; N: total observations; n: countries; T: time periods. 
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